Fourth Generation Warfare

Fourth Generation Warfare

 Colonel Thomas Hammes’ book, The Sling and the Stone, is subtitled “On War in the 21^st Century”.

 In it he describes 1. the evolvement of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) from its predecessors, 2. the defeat of two superpowers through asymmetric warfare, and then 3. the characteristics of 4^th Generation Warfare.

 There are many ideas in this book that are new to me. I thought it might help for me to write down the characteristics of this warfare and it might be of interest to you to know what our military leaders imagine warfare will be like in this century. I do not provide my thoughts on the content of this book in this posting. I will do that in another article.  

 Let’s begin with this:

 ”Beginning with Mao’s concept that political will could defeat superior military power and progressing to Intifada 1’s total reliance on the mass media and international networks to neutralize Israel’s military power and political process, warfare underwent a fundamental change. It shifted from an Industrial-Age focus on the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces to an Information-Age focus on changing the minds of the enemy’s political decision makers.”-Col. Hammes

 Col.  Hammes then describes what happened in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and the defeat of the US and USSR by asymmetric warfare. Superior weaponry, training, and technology were defeated by insurgencies that had a greater will to win then the superpowers.

 Here are the characteristics of 4GW:

 

Strategy Characteristic #1: Change the mind of the enemy’s political decision makers through the use of all available networks by sending specific messages to policy makers and to those that influence policy makers. One message goes to the insurgent’s supporters, one goes to the mass of the undecided population, and one goes to the enemy’s decision makers.

Strategy Characteristic # 2: Use materials available in modern society, when necessary,  to create civilian casualties. This permits the 4GW practitioner to avoid defending core assets and relieves him form the burden to move supplies from area to area.

Strategy Characteristic #3: Non-state actors (gangs, warlords, drug traffickers, tribes and clans) can shift alliances for many different reasons and may find it to their advantage to attack government forces for local gains.

Strategy Characteristic #4: Use the media to convey images to political decision makers on both sides of the conflict. Note that all wars become local wars if images of war can be brought into the living room (or computer room) of the combatants. Wars of isolation in remote areas will no longer be fought between mechanized and technology-enhanced armies.

Strategy Characteristic #5: When the political will has shifted in your favor, strike decisively to achieve the destruction of the target nation or government.

Strategy Characteristic #6: Create political paralysis through the use and manipulation of national and international organizations. Utilize transnational organizations, like charities, as a source of funds for military actions. North Vietnam and the Sandinistas targeted Congress to cut off funding for US military operations. 

 

Operational Characteristic #1: The target is the message. 4GW warfare involves the message to send, the target to convey the message, and the operational feedback to show that the intended recipient of the message has indeed understood its meaning.

Operational Characteristic #2: The use of area-denial weapons may become more prevalent than physical destruction weapons. Col. Hammes cites the anthrax letters as an example of denying the use of the Senate Building.

Operational Characteristic #3: Imposing huge economic costs with little effort may be an effective technique for terrorists.

Operational Characteristic #4: The warfare may be global in scope and not locally oriented. This would suggest that targets are not immune because of their distance from the conflict area. The engagement of multiple targets at multiple distances to break the political will of the decision makers may be undertaken.

Operational Characteristic #5: NGOs may become involved in 4GW at the national and regional level due to their global presence.

 

Tactical Characteristic #1: Changing the minds of decision makers may involve the use of messages to government officials thru religious, academic, artistic, and social networks. It may also involve protesters, media interviews, web sites, and other nonviolent resources to create political dilemmas for decision makers.

Tactical Characteristic #2: Making false accusations will tie up military resources that should be used elsewhere. Defense against false accusations may result in questions regarding the truthfulness of the government.

Tactical Characteristic #3: The use of local material to create weapons implies that transport and storage of weapons is not necessary. Commercial sources of materials may provide a venue for weapons.

 Timelines, Organizations, and Objectives

 TOC #1: Timelines may exceed decades of involvement.

TOC #2: Political objectives are more important than tactical effectiveness. 4GW leaders are networked to provide for long term viability.

TOC #3: 4GW focuses on changing the minds of the political leaders and their will.